The Governance of Rebel Alliances in Civil Wars

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Civil wars are rarely fought between a single insurgent group and the state but rather are crowded arenas in which different rebel organisations must decide whether to fight alone or to cooperate with rivals whose loyalty is never assured. When rebels do ally, how do they govern their relations with one another, and which institutional mechanisms hold a coalition together?

This book answers these questions by introducing the concept of horizontal wartime institutions, the bodies rebel groups build to govern rebel-to-rebel relations when part of coalitions. While the rebel governance literature has focused on how armed groups govern civilians, this book turns to a parallel and overlooked class of institution-building, including joint commands, political councils, and shared governing bodies through which coalition members manage rebel-to-rebel relations. Developing a typology of tactical and strategic, homogeneous and heterogeneous alliances, it shows how the different types of coalitions shape the institutions they create. Furthermore, the book aims to capture the institutional mechanisms that rebels create to govern such institutions, arguing that power-sharing mechanisms create the conditions for cohesive alliances during wartime.

Drawing on the Syrian Civil War and the Italian partisan movement and its National Liberation Committees (1943-1945), the book offers a framework to understand how rebel groups govern rebel-to-rebel relations when part of alliances, and which institutional mechanisms contribute to the alliance's internal cohesion.

Why do rebel groups ally, and what makes some alliances more cohesive than others? This book develops an original typology of rebel alliances rooted in the identity of the armed groups involved, such as ethnicity and ideology, and the objectives they collectively pursue. Tactical alliances, oriented toward short-term, instrumental goals, require little more than momentary convergence of interest. Strategic alliances, by contrast, are based on shared transformative projects, such as regime overthrow. It is in these latter arrangements that cohesion becomes a central theoretical and practical concern. The book argues that establishing and implementing power-sharing mechanisms is crucial for determining the payoff structure available to coalition members and for raising the costs of defection, thereby sustaining cooperation under conditions of profound uncertainty. The argument is grounded in empirical analysis spanning two distinct conflicts. Drawing on the Syrian Civil War, the book examines how the typology's logic plays out across a fragmented and rapidly evolving conflict landscape, tracing the conditions under which different alliance types emerge. The question of cohesion is then addressed through an in-depth comparative analysis of two cases: the Syrian Democratic Forces in the Syrian Civil War (2011-2024) and the National Liberation Committee in the Italian Civil War (1943 1945). Together, these cases illuminate the conditions under which strategic alliances among rebel groups achieve durable cohesion in civil wars.

Chapter 1: Introduction.- Chapter 2: Emergence, Cohesion, and Collapse of Rebel Alliances.- Chapter 3: Dynamics and Actors in the Syrian Civil War.- Chapter 4: Rebel Alliances in the Syrian Civil War.- Chapter 5: Alliance Cohesion and Power-Sharing Mechanisms in the Syrian Democratic Forces.- Chapter 6: Governing the Resistance: Power-Sharing Institutions in the Italian Civil War (1943-1945).- Chapter 7: Conclusions.

Edoardo Corradi is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the University of Bologna. His work focuses on rebel alliances and rebel governance in civil wars and has been published in outlets including Civil Wars, Small Wars & Insurgencies, Media, War & Conflict, Mediterranean Politics, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, and Italian Political Science Review. He taught courses on Security Studies and International Relations at Sciences Po, Florida International University, and the University of Genoa.

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