§16§The book sets out to analyze the notion of a priori justification and of a priori knowledge. The most influential explanations of the a priori within the contemporary analytic tradition are analyzed. It is shown that the theories which group around the notion of implicit definition ultimately entail that the propositions which can be known a priori are to be analyzed along conventionalist lines. It is argued that the notion of objective a priori knowledge requires a commitment to the existence of a faculty which is the source of and justifies that kind of knowledge. The existence and functioning of this faculty cannot be explained within a strictly naturalistic set of constraints. Attention to the phenomenology of justification (validation) both of observational and purportedly a priori statements however reveals that the naturalistic demands are based on an asymmetry thesis among perception (and credited genuine sources of justification) and rational insight which is false. There §16§fore it is argued that a corresponding symmetry thesis must be accepted, according to which rational insight should be regarded as a justification-conferring faculty. In the final part of the book it is argued that Husserl's conception of the analytic/synthetic distinction, and of concept constitution, allow for an objective interpretation both of analytic and synthetic a priori knowledge. §04§Introduction§1. A Priori, Analyticity, and Implicit Definition§Empiricism, Analyticity, and the A Priori§Reductive and Non-Reductive Conceptions of Analyticity§Implicit Definition, Logical Truth, and the Recalcitrant A Priori§Problems with Implicit Definition§BonJour s Objection§Fodor and Lepore s Objection§Horwich s Objection§Hale and Wright s defence of the traditional connection§Logic and Convention§Coda§2. Realism about Logic§Introduction§Logical Principles, Justification and Epistemic Relativity§Objective Truth§Resnik s Attack§Wittgenstein on the necessity of 1 inch = 2.54 cm §and logical inference§Dummett s Objection§Rule Following considerations and the adoption of a convention§Summarising Remarks§Wright s Attack§3. Objective Knowledge§Introduction§What the Tortoise Said to Boghossian§What Boghossian would say to the Tortoise§Rule-circular Arguments§The Side-Argument§Rejecting the Side-Argument§First Horn: Simple Internalism and Rational Insight§Second Horn: Epistemic Respo §04§nsibility and the Lack§of Epistemic Irresponsibility§Realism, the A priori and Rational Insight§Boghossian s Argument against Relativism§Epistemological Realism about Justification§Conclusion§4. Phenomenology and Rational Insight§Naturalism and Justification§Phenomenology, Justification, and Eidetic Seeing§Is Holism a Possibility for the Empiricist?§Intuition of Essences and the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction§Husserl s Conception of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction§Eidetic Variation§Passive synthesis and Concept Constitution§Knowledge of Reality and Conceptual Truth§Absolute vs Relative Objectivity§Are Conceptual Truths True?§Conclusion§References
