Empathy is often seen as a window into others’ minds, effectively guiding our decisions and moral judgments about them. But what if this assumption is dangerously wrong? This book challenges the popular view of empathy as a desirable ally in our deliberative processes, revealing the pitfalls of this phenomenon. Drawing on insights from moral philosophy, philosophy of mind, epistemology, and applied psychology, the book argues that the standard definition of empathy—combining perspective-taking, emotional sharing, and concern for others—can be profoundly inaccurate and motivate immoral actions or unfair judgments. To address these shortcomings, this work offers a novel phenomenological approach. Building on Edith Stein’s account, alongside contributions from Husserl, Scheler, and contemporary phenomenologists, it redefines empathy as a quasi-perceptual, quasi-imaginative experience of others' inner states, recognizing them as persons with unique motives and values. This phenomenological approach provides a better conceptual framework for understanding empathy and its role in deliberation while avoiding the problematic consequences of popular definitions in the literature.
