Authoritarian Survival and Leadership Succession in North Korea and Beyond examines how dictators manage elites to facilitate succession. Theoretically, it argues that personalistic incumbents facilitate the construction of a power base of elites from outside of their inner circle to help the successor govern once he comes to power. Then, once in office, successors consolidate power by initially relying on this power base to govern while marginalizing elites from their predecessor's inner circle before later targeting members of their own power base to further consolidate power. The Element presents evidence for these arguments from North Korea's two leadership transitions, leveraging original qualitative and quantitative evidence from inside North Korea. Comparative vignettes of succession in party-based China, Egypt's military regime, and monarchical Saudi Arabia demonstrate the theory's broader applicability. The Element contributes to research on comparative authoritarianism by highlighting how dictators use the non-institutional tool of elite management to facilitate succession.
